



This is the published version 
 
Mansouri, Fethi and Percival Wood, Sally 2006, Exploring the Australia-Middle 
East connection, in Australia and the Middle East: a front-line relationship, Tauris 


















Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been 
obtained for items included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your 
rights have been infringed by this repository, please contact 





Copyright: 2008, I.B.Tauris 
1 
EXPLORING THE AUSTRALIA-
MIDDLE EAST CONNECTION 
Fethi Mansouri and SallY Percival Wood 
For much of its relatively short history Australia has looked to Britain, 1 
and more recently the US, for a sense of national identity, economic 
prosperity and security. Until the mid-1970s the 'White Australia' Policy 
shaped the cultural image to which Australia aspired in a predominantly 
non-European region and was a clear reflection of its projected regional 
and international relationships. Times have certainly changed with Asia 
looming as a serious economic partner and further afield the Middle East 
emerging as a critical region for both security and economic objectives. 
This book focuses on Australia's increasingly multifaceted engagement 
with the Middle East, highlighting the need to unlock the complex 
nature of this region and the potential for improved bilateral exchanges. 
Australia's involvement in Middle Eastern affairs - manifested in its 
current military engagement in both Iraq and Afghanistan - is not a 
new phenomenon, though discussions of this relationship have 
unfortunately tended to be ahistoricaL In fact, Australia's role in the 
emergence of the Palestinian question could not have been more central. 
Australia played a leading role in post-Second World War deliberations 
within the newly established United Nations (UN) and 'in 1947 
participated in the creation of a United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine (UNSCOP) when Britain announced on 20 September 1947 
that it planned to withdraw from Palestine by My 1948.'2 In addition to 
the leading role played by Australia's then-Foreign Minister Dr Herbert 
Vere 'Doc' Evatt in ensuring that UNSCOP's proposed partition plan 
was adopted by a majority of UN members, 'early in 1948 Australia was 
the first western nation to accord full recognition to IsraeL'3 Given this 
early involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, it is a surprise that 
Australia's subsequent interactions with the region have been 
constrained by what Foreign Minister William McMahon in 1970 called 
'a position of strict neutrality'4 towards events in the region. One would, 
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of course, need to question this neutrality claim given Australia's strong 
alignment with the US position on all matters involving Israel. 
Nevertheless, over the past 50 years, the Middle East in Australian 
thinking continued to be associated with international conflicts, global 
economic crises and more recently the flow of forced migrants. The 
current relationship, therefore, needs to be viewed as a reflection of all of 
these historical encounters with the recent addition of a strong trade 
dimension. 
On the surface, Australia's engagement with the Middle East appears 
to be steadily building: bilateral trade agreements with the Gulf States 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are currently under fresh 
negotiation; a diplomatic presence has been established in Kuwait with 
the opening of an Embassy there in late 2004; Algeria appointed an 
Ambassador to Canberra in February 2005; and a further contingent of 
Australian troops was dispatched in 2005 to augment its military support 
of the US intervention in Iraq. While historically Australia has always had 
a relationship with the Middle East, it is one that has tended to be 
ideologically filtered through its external relationships: ftrstly via its 
commitment to the British Empire and engagement in the Middle East 
during the First World War; secondly, and more recently, through its 
strategic alliance with the United States (US) which, this book will argue, 
shadows the foreign policy interests of the US, rather than an 
authentically Australian association. Internally, Australia's relationship 
with the Middle East has been filtered through the ideology of the White 
Australia Policy which, dating from 1901 through to 1973, reflected an 
enduring Anglo-Celtic priority that some argue has been difftcult to 
dislodge from the Australian psyche. The foundations of Australia's 
direct engagement with the Middle East therefore remain either 
circumscribed by its military engagements in the region (from Gallipoli 
in 1915 to Iraq in 2006) or somewhat apprehensive in terms of its 
acceptance of Middle Eastern migrants from Afghan cameleers circa 
1860 to asylum seekers and refugees in the present. 
Historically, Australia's external relationships have been reflective of a 
somewhat tenuous sense of identity, which was evident in a 1999 federal 
referendum when Australians opted to retain constitutional links with 
Britain's monarchy rather than move to a republic. An Anglo-Celtic 
conservatism and wariness of difference thus hovers in the margins of 
Australia's embrace of multiculturalism, and this is most tellingly 
demonstrated in Australia's at times difficult relationship with its Asian 
neighbours. Walker, in Australia and Asia, reflects on this relationship as 
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one in which, historically, Australia has revealed a certain anxiety that its 
'fragile culture ... might easily be overwhelmed by the populous nations 
to its north.'s Though comprehensive studies of Australia's relationship 
with the Middle East have not been undertaken to anywhere near the 
extent to which Australia's relationship with Asia has been analysed, 
similar cultural apprehensions, particularly in relation to Arab and 
Muslim migrants to this country, would not be too extravagant a claim. 
This book aims to fill the significant gap that exists in literature on the 
Australia-Middle East relationship, not only by bringing together these 
major aspects of the relationship in one volume, but by exploring new 
areas of potential which have hitherto remained rather fragmented areas 
of discourse. Still, despite the broad range of inquiry attempted in this 
volume, some areas remain ripe for further investigation. For example, 
few scholars have developed a thorough study of Australia's political 
response, and contribution, to the Middle East Peace Process, which 
remains an underdeveloped area of academic investigation in Australia. 
Similarly, any substantial investigation into the nature of the trade 
relationship, taking it beyond its current import-export parameters with 
specific existing trading partners, is difficult to locate. This is highlighted 
in MacQueen's chapter which explores the untapped potential of 
Australia's trading relationship with North Africa, followed by Mansouri 
and Sankari's identification of the need for Australia to take a more 
comprehensive approach to trade by developing the broader links to 
human rights in advancing economic relations with the Middle East. 
Through ambassadorial and consular representation, Australia maintains 
a presence in the wealthier Middle Eastern states of Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
I(uwait and the UAE, but among the region'S less affluent nations, such 
as some Maghrib states (tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania), 
Australia has no presence at all. 6 The potential for a deepening mutual 
relationship is, of course, also dictated by the requirement within much 
of the Gulf that agents or representatives, who are required to be 
nationals, must be engaged by offshore companies to facilitate trade 
negotiations. 7 And in the UAE, for example, business is frequently 
conducted via the South Asians who occupy many of the senior and 
middle management positions there,8 which erects a barrier to direct 
engagement with Middle Eastern counterparts. An analysis of this aspect 
of the Australia-Middle East relationship is again an area that is under-
scrutinized by Australian academia. 
The momentum of Australia's relationship with the Middle East 
appears to remain set within the paradigm of economic and military 
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activity, somewhat reminiscent of the imperial age. While closer trade 
ties with the Middle East are an important priority in expanding bilateral 
collaborations, as with Australia's military engagement in Iraq, these 
externally projected enterprises appear to operate 'out there'. Any 
potential misgivings about the trade relationship have been exacerbated 
in recent years with a dispute that saw the suspension of live sheep 
exports to Saudi Arabia in 2003 and the latest scandal involving the 
Australian Wheat Board's secret payments to Saddam Hussein under the 
UN's oil-far-food program. We have recently seen Australia inject 
additional military support into Iraq, a move that further circumscribes 
its Middle East relationship within military parameters. However, closer 
to the centre of public and political dialogue domestically is pressure 
around asylum seekers, a discourse that had, until recently, appeared to 
have stagnated. Since 2000 Iraqi, Iranian and Afghani refugees have been 
among the main nationalities held in Australian immigration detention 
centres. 9 Their presence has fuelled a media-driven fear of an 'influx' of 
a new 'other', replacing an earlier paranoia - with roots stretching back 
to the nineteenth-century gold rush era - characterized by the 'Asian 
invasion' or 'yellow peril'. This coincides with a significant hardening of 
Australians towards onshore asylum seekers. For example, during the 
1970s, Australia accepted some 2000 refugees or 'boat people' from 
Vietnam 10 and when polled in 1979, only 28 per cent of the population 
believed that refugees arriving by boat should be put back to sea. In 
2001, that figure had ballooned to 68 per cent and a substantial 76 per 
cent agreed that the Tampa 'boat people' should not be allowed to return 
to Australia. it This pinpoints Australia's Achilles heel in its relationship 
with the Middle East and the area where a more erudite and scholarly 
discourse is needed to move it beyond the confines of economic and 
military priorities and into a more sensitive, perceptive engagement. 
Another point of contact between Australia and the Middle East is 
aid, which is generally provided via multilateral organizations such as the 
World Food Programme and UNICEF. Australia's direct involvement is, 
however, minimal when compared with the financial support that it 
provides to states in its own region. Australian aid assistance to the 
Middle East is limited to Palestine and Iraq: support for Palestine in 
2003-2004 was around AUD $11 million and this will be increased to 
AUD $16 million in 2005-2006;12 aid for the rebuilding of Iraq has been 
estimated at AUD $126 million for the same period,13 but even this 
more generous amount is modest compared to Australia's commitment 
to regions closer to home. For example, in the wake of the Indian Ocean 
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tsunami disaster Australia has committed AUD $1 billion over the next 
five years to Indonesia,14 and Papua New Guinea will receive AUD 
$492.3 million in ongoing financial aid during the 2005-06 period. is This 
rather uneven approach to aid is reflective of the overall discourse on 
Australia's relationship with the Middle East. 
There have been some publications focusing on specific, 
particularized aspects of Australia's engagement with the Middle East, 
such as military, economic or demographic studies, but in both historical 
and contemporary terms, this complex relationship remains academically 
underdeveloped. 16 Australia and the Middle East: A Frontline Relationship 
aims to develop the first comprehensive scholarly text to trace through 
the history of the Australia-Middle East engagement, from the First 
World War, to areas of potential strengthening of the engagement post-
9/11. This objective is all the more important in the current political 
climate. Insight into the multi-layered nature of the relationship, past 
encounters, evaluating present policies and developing a framework for 
future interactions, will provide an essential basis for improved 
understanding and more articulate discourse. Rather than focusing on 
one single aspect of the relationship, this book seeks to draw together its 
various dimensions across three themes, beginning with Australia's 
military and migration relationship with the Middle East in pre-
Federation days. The challenges posed by 9/11 and the West's response, 
with which Australia has been allied, informs the second half of the 
book, exploring Australia's relationships with Arabs and Muslims both at 
home and abroad. The fmal section examines future trade potentials, 
Australia's increasing strategic interest, and current military involvement 
in the region, which will include its approach to humanitarian 
interventions. 
What is 'the Middle East'? 
If one is to understand Australia's relationship with a region as diverse 
and complex as the Middle East, then it is crucial to outline from the 
outset what precisely is meant by this term. The 'Middle East' entered 
geopolitical parlance at the turn of the twentieth century when it was 
identified loosely as the region lying between the 'Near East' (the region 
of the Ottoman Empire) and the 'Far East' (India, China and Japan), an 
area of strategic significance to the imperial interests of Britain and 
France. The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian 
Difence published in 190317 alerted Europe to the changing nature of land 
and sea defence with the establishment of railway networks across Asia, 
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which provided new possibilities for access and the need for greater 
geopolitical defmition. In 1921, Britain's 'Middle East Department' was 
established by its Secretary of State for Colonies, Winston Churchill, and 
subsequently became a more tangible geographical region encompassing 
Iraq, Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Aden. 18 The 'Middle East' was an area 
delineated at that time 'to denote a non-Western space, a region to be 
controlled, ruled or confined by the West but not assimilated.'19 
Among the first countries to extricate themselves from European 
imperialism were Egypt in 1922, Iraq in 1932, and Trans-Jordan, Syria 
and Lebanon in 1946, leading the decolonization momentum as it then 
swept across Asia and Africa. Once Tunisia and Morocco freed 
themselves from France in 1956, followed by Algeria in 1962, this group 
of independent nation-states consolidated a newly defined Middle East 
albeit within redrawn borders. A definitive demarcation of the Middle 
East, however, remains somewhat elastic, even more so since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union which saw the emergence of Muslim 
nation-states Azerbaijan, K.azakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, states which might potentially be seen as 
enlarging the current Middle East. For the purposes of this book, 
however, the Middle East includes those nation-states which share a 
number of key cultural, linguistic and religious attributes, most notably 
Islam and the Arabic language, with the obvious exception of Israel. In 
the adoption of this broad definition of the Middle East, one notes that 
all but Israel are Muslim countries with nearly 90 per cent of the region's 
population identified as such, although Lebanon, Egypt and Syria are all 
multi-confessional societies with varying proportions of Muslim and 
Christian denominations. Moreover, and with the exception of Turkey, 
Iran, Afghanistan and Israel, the region's states are all Arab, which 
explains the dominant status of Arabic language, at least at the cultural 
level. 
In addition to this cultural and linguistic diversity, the region is also 
characterized by a significant disparity in wealth distribution between 
major oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and I<uwait and the 
non-producers of oil such as Jordan, Sudan, Yemen and Syria. In fact, 
the oil-rich countries rank among the world's wealthiest in terms of 
GNP, while the non-producers of oil are among the world's poorest 
states. This economic gap is manifested in the level of investment 
different countries in the region are able to make in key areas such as the 
development of infrastructure, health, education and other social 
benefits. 
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Both the cultural diversity and the economic gap among many 
countries within the region means that the potential for disharmony 
exists both internally, because of this cultural and religious diversity, as 
well as externally, because of the region'S natural resources and its 
increased importance to the global economy. Internally, the Iraq 
conflicts of 1991 and 2003, in particular, created a polarity in the Arab 
world leaving it 'deeply divided and incapable of any collective action'20 
despite Shimon Peres' optimistic vision post-1991 for a 'New Middle 
East' modelled on the European Union. 21 In terms of its external 
relationships, the Middle East, as the site of over half the world's oil 
resources, exerts considerable economic influence over oil dependent 
economies, particularly China, India and the US where demand for oil 
has boomed in 2005. But the recipients of oil's largesse is restricted to 
the Middle East's oil producing nations which are, in turn, the nations 
with which Australia covets an increasing economic interest, such as 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. 
Key Themes 
This exploration of Australia's relationship with the Middle East begins 
by looking at a history framed by immigration and multicultural diversity 
extending back to Australia's period of settlement in the nineteenth 
century. Walker begins in Chapter 2 with his study of an inherent anxiety 
about the 'other' in Australian history. Australian representations of the 
Middle East, while differently inflected, can hardly be separated from the 
cultural anxieties evident in its response to Asia. 'Perilous Encounters: 
Australia, Asia and the Middle East' provides an historical overview of 
the ways in which Asia has been represented in Australia along with a 
discussion of the process by which 'Australia' was understood to be 
different from 'Asia'. Walker then goes on to consider the representation 
of the Middle East in Australia: whether it was historically conceived as 
being a part of Asia or whether it was differently represented in 
Australia. The chapter addresses the cultural dynamics of representation 
and the imagery associated with the societies, religions, and landscapes of 
the Middle East. It comments both on the changes in this imagery over 
time and the persistence of cultural stereotypes. 
These enduring stereotypes, as Lowe explains in Chapter 3, have their 
origins in Australia's military involvement in the Middle East around a 
century ago when a revealing taxonomy of identifiers was established. In 
his chapter 'From Sudan to Suez: Strategic Encounters', as the title 
suggests, Lowe further elucidates themes of Australia's military 
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involvement in the Middle East established by Walker. While Australia's 
current relationship with the Middle East is largely characterized by its 
support of the US in its 'war on terror' in Afghanistan and Iraq, direct 
Australian strategic involvement in the Middle East can be dated from 
1885, before Australia was a federal nation-state. It was in the late 
nineteenth century that the self-governing Colony of New South Wales 
sent a military contingent in support of imperial forces countering the 
Mahdi-Ied revolt, a milestone also highlighted by Lowe in this volume. 
Not only was this a defining moment in terms of an intertwining 
between Australian nation-making and service in imperial causes, but it 
also stands at the beginning of a line of significant Australian episodes of 
military encounters with, and strategic planning for, the Middle East. 
When Australian expeditionary forces sailed to the cause of empire in the 
First and Second World Wars, they went first to Egypt, for training and 
preparation. Then, at the height of Cold War fears about a third world 
war in the early 1950s, Australian military planners again agreed to send 
an expeditionary force to the Middle East in order to safeguard British 
air bases that would be used to launch atomic strikes on the Soviet 
Union. Similarly in 1956, Australia became directly involved in efforts to 
resolve the Suez Crisis. Cumulatively, the story up to 1956 is one of close 
involvement in imperial defence plans involving the Middle East, and of 
the Middle East becoming an important source of Australians' 
assumptions about their role in world affairs. 
After the Second World War the make up of Australia's migrant 
intake shifted considerably. Middle Eastern emigres, however, remained 
something of a classification conundrum for the Australian authorities. 
Neither European nor Asian, this group was compelled to work around 
an immigration policy that was constrained by notions of race. In 
Chapter 4 Batrouney explores patterns in migration and settlement over 
the last 120 or so years by identifying government policies across four 
historical periods: the White Australia Policy (1880s-1920s); the period 
of assimilation (1950s-1970s); the period of multiculturalism (1970s-
1990s);. and the last decade of the twentieth century referred to as 
'beyond multiculturalism'. Batrouney aims to situate the story of Middle 
Eastern migration and settlement within the broader picture of the 
Australian story and, in doing so, discovers the mutual efforts made 
towards building an enduring relationship. While Arab-Australians have 
made efforts to become accepted and respected as citizens, and at the 
same time strived to maintain valued elements of their cultural identity, 
the post-9/11 climate has presented significant challenges. 
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The post-9/11 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, with which 
Australia was (and remains) militarily involved, have significantly 
destabilised infrastructure, security remains fragile, and have done 
nothing to temper the flow of refugees from those two states. Though 
the repatriation of Afghan or Iraqi refugees therefore remains tenuous at 
best, the temporary nature of Australia's policy toward onshore asylum 
seekers provides no guarantee of any lasting refuge in Australia, to their 
severe psychological detriment. In mid-2002, after the Taliban regime 
had been toppled in Afghanistan, Australia's then-Immigration Minister 
Phillip Ruddock set about planning the return of Afghan refugees, which 
included a monetary incentive of AUD $2000 for individuals and AUD 
$10,000 for families. This coincided with the Australian Government's 
assessment of the situation in Afghanistan which, according to Maley 
(Australia's leading expert on Afghanistan and a contributor to this 
volume), 'should be regarded not simply as misleading, but as highly 
irresponsible.'22 Maley's appraisal proved correct, if the fact that only 33 
of Australia's 3400 Afghan refugees' ~ess than one per cent) acceptance 
of the offer is any indication. 23 Similarly, immediately after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein in May 2003, and despite the UNHCR's 
recommendation that repatriation of Iraqis would be premature before 
2005, the Australian Government began urging their return. Twenty-
three agreed, more because life in Iraq would hold less fears than the 
'present horrors in Australian detention'24 than their willingness to do 
so. Australia's flagrant disregard of the UNHCR's advice was followed in 
December 2003 by Iraq's exhortations to allow refugees to stay in 
Australia until security had improved and 'until we have the capability for 
receiving these people and providing them with housing.'25 
In Chapter 5, Saeed explores the history of migration from the Middle 
East rather more specifically as he surveys the presence of Islam and 
Muslims in Australia, and how these groups have made conscious moves 
towards fIrmly establishing themselves socially. Beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century, Saeed traverses the various phases of Australian 
immigration from 'White Australia' through to recent patterns of Islamic 
migration, assimilation and integration. The impact of a series of external 
events, such as the Gulf War in 1991 and 9/11 a decade later, which was 
closely followed by the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002 and an attack 
on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, is examined. This series of events, 
apparently establishing a 'dash of civilizations' or a 'West and the rest' 
mentality, has culminated in the so-called 'war on terror'. The creation of 
deep philosophical and ideological opposition framed by 'terror' has 
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shifted an already at times tentative equilibrium within Muslim 
communities living in the West. Since those external events, the presence 
of onshore asylum seekers in Australia has taken an unsettling turn 
towards regressive, 'Islamicized' fears of the 'other'. The Lowy Institute's 
poll found that the Middle East, Iran and Iraq are the least favourably 
viewed countries or regions by Australians: 69 per cent of those polled 
had negative feelings about the Middle East; 68 per cent about Iran; and 
72 per cent about Iraq. 26 
Such negative responses confIrm the harmful cultural stereotypes 
perpetuated in the Australian media, a phenomenon that Saeed addresses 
in Chapter 5. Such media representations do not go unnoticed by Middle 
Eastern states with which Australia simultaneously covets closer trade 
ties. In particular, Arabic media sources such as AI-]azeera and the Khaletj 
Times have kept pace with Australia's treatment of refugees and 
mandatory detention policies, and often respond to these issues. For 
example, the infamous 'children overboard' episode prompted scathing 
editorial in the Khaled Times which questioned Australians' projected self-
image27 and a gruesome image of an Afghan refugee with lips sewn 
together appeared in the Middle East's highest profile media outlet, AI-
Jazeera. 28 The mounting desperation of Arabs and Muslims held in 
remote detention centres reached a climax in mid-200S and families with 
children were fInally released from detention at the end of July. The 
labyrinth of Australia's increasingly complex visa regime for refugees and 
asylum seekers, a topic that Mansouri investigates in Chapter 6, however, 
remains. In March 2005 Australia's Immigration Minister Amanda 
Vanstone introduced measures intended to release long term detainees 
awaiting removal from detention and release them into the community. 
This move was welcomed as an important, albeit small, step in the right 
direction but it was roundly criticised for the signifIcant obstacles which 
would make the new visa accessible to only very few detainees. 
Enthusiasm was also tempered by the fact that this new sub-class visa 
removes none of the inhumanity of uncertainty under the temporary visa 
regime .. The minimalism of the Minister's attempt to breathe some 
compassion into the burning issue of refugee detention has recently been 
characterised as Australia's 'new politics of indifference'. 29 
Mansouri ventures more deeply into the re-emergence of a culture of 
'otherness' in Australia and examines Australia's policy responses during 
its recent encounters with asylum seekers from the Middle East. He 
focuses on the social and political contexts within which exclusionary 
policies have been formulated and justifIed in the public domain in the 
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wake of 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in Indonesia, flrst in Bali in 2002 
and then the Australian Embassy bombing in 2004, which brought the 
spectre of terrorism much closer to home. Speciflcally, he focuses on the 
Federal Government's introduction of 'deterrence' measures which 
include temporary protection visas, offshore mandatory detention of 
asylum seekers in Pacific island nations, and the deliberate linking of 
treatment of refugees to border protection and security threats. Mansouri 
argues that this episode in Australia's long history of accepting 
humanitarian entrants has undermined its reputation in the region and 
internationally, raised serious questions about its commitment to 
multiculturalism, and exacerbated an existing undercurrent of exclusion 
and denigration among members of Arabic and Muslim communities. 
This sense of anxiety about the direction of Australia's refugee policies 
targeted at .Middle Eastern asylum seekers has been intensified by media 
coverage which, Mansouri explains, focuses on Muslim asylum seekers as 
deviant, undeserving and troublesome. They have been deliberately 
represented not only as the undeserving other but also as potentially 
hostile strangers. 
Batrouney, Saeed and Mansouri's chapters clearly expose the need for 
Australia, in developing its relationship with the .Middle East, to come to 
a more sophisticated understanding of Islam and Muslim culture. 
Currently, Australia's most immediate external engagement with Islam is 
experienced through its relationship with Indonesia, where the world's 
largest population of Muslims live. Australia's historical relationship with 
Indonesia is therefore reflective of the nature of its perceptions of Islam, 
which had to become rapidly more acute after 9/11 and, more 
particularly, after October 12. As Barton explains in Chapter 7, if 9/11 
changed Australia's view of the .Middle East then October 12 changed its 
view of Islam and its need to engage with Islamic issues. 9/11 was a 
brutal reminder that neo-Wahhabi extremism in Saudi Arabia is not 
something the world can simply close its eyes to and hope that it will go 
away, while the Bali attack awoke Australia to the fact that Jihadi 
extremism is no longer neatly contained at 'the other end' of the Islamic 
world. Barton points out that Australia has long been accustomed to 
believing that 'our region' on the eastern periphery of the Islamic world 
was different from, and unconnected to, the .Middle East. Unfortunately, 
Australia also took this to mean that it did not need to seriously concern 
itself with understanding, much less engage with, Islam in Southeast 
Asia. Australia is now becoming increasingly aware that globalization is 
not just about American fast food franchises and MIT. Barton goes on 
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to analyse Southeast Asian Islam and its own exposure to globalization, 
which absorbs influences from the Middle East and its environs. This 
means that Australia, he concludes, needs to pay greater heed to a raft of 
much more complex issues than it had previously imagined. This is 
particularly pertinent as Australia ramps up both its military presence in 
Iraq and its trade negotiations in the Middle East region. 
In Chapter 8, Burchill moves the discussion of Australia's military 
presence in the Middle East to the current situation when he analyses the 
events of 9/11 and the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. He points out 
the significance of 9/11 and its impact upon Canberra's policy towards 
the Middle East and, in particular, towards the Israel-Palestine conflict 
and Iraq. Australian foreign policy, he suggests, has shifted from a pre-
9/11 approach that favoured Israel and ~as framed within the pretence 
of even-handedness. Post-9/11, policy towards the dispute has dropped 
any such pretence to become almost indistinguishable from 
Washington's neo-conservative 'Likudnik' approach. In reality, he 
concludes, Australian policy is now vicariously formed. In its response to 
each terrorist attack in Israel, Australia's reflexive support for the so 
called 'roadmap', its attitude to the Palestinian leadership, and more 
recently in an altered voting pattern in the United Nations, Australia has 
accepted Tel Aviv's claim that Palestinian militancy should be conflated 
with the global threat of militant Islam, and that Israel's response should 
be seen as part of President Bush's 'war on terror'. This is a departure 
from previous Labor Party and earlier Coalition (Liberal and National 
party) policy which was overtly sympathetic to Israel, conscious of the 
power and influence of the Jewish lobby, but recognised the legitimate 
aspirations of the Palestinians and the need for a settlement that was fair 
to both sides. Ignoring the impact of 35 years of brutal occupation, 
refusing to accept the legitimacy of anti-colonial resistance and insisting 
on an end to Palestinian attacks as a pre-requisite to any peace 
negotiations is the approach of Washington, Tel Aviv and now Canberra, 
towards the Middle East. 
Australia's contribution to the war against Iraq in 2003 was a 
significant escalation from its minor role in 1990-91. Burchill explains 
that this should not be seen as a new found interest in the region, which 
has been and remains primarily commercial. Iraq was not a security 
threat to Australia, nor was it a regional priority. British and US pretexts 
for the war, copied by the Australian Government, proved to be either 
fatuous, imaginary or based on poor intelligence. In particular, Saddam's 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not found and belated 
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humanitarian concerns expressed in 2003 were not raised in the 1980s at 
the peak of Saddam's crimes. Australia's joint invasion and occupation of 
Iraq in March-April 2003 should therefore be understood as a reflection 
of the growing alignment in the global outlook shared by Canberra and 
Washington. Australia is not a main player in the Middle East, however, 
via the close public relationship established between the Howard 
Government and the Bush Administration, Burchill asserts that Australia 
is building itself a proftle in the region which might well run counter to 
its long term interests. 
Australia's involvement in major military operations in the Middle 
East continues to raise important questions about the foundations of 
Australian foreign policy. In Chapter 9, Maley points out that the 
geographical propinquity of Afghanistan and Iraq should not disguise the 
fundamental differences between these two cases. In the case of 
Afghanistan, the 9/11 attacks provided a strong basis for international 
action (Operation Enduring Freedom), which had firm grounding in 
international law. In the case of Iraq, international action (Operation 
Iraqi Freedom) was based on shaky legal grounds, and even shakier 
factual premises. On 31 March 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, established in February 2004 to examine the veracity of 
military intelligence used to support the coalition invasion of Iraq, 
released its report to the President. The report found the invasion to be 
'one of the most public - and most damaging - intelligence failures in 
recent American history' and the US intelligence community to be 
seriously deficient. 30 Australia's Prime Minister commissioned a similar 
report on 4 March 2004 a few days after a Parliamentary inquiry into its 
intelligence agencies ASIO (Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation), ASIS (Australian Security Intelligence Service) and DSD 
(Defence Signals Directories) was released. 31 While the Report if the 
Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies, released in July 2004, found the 
Australian Government had not applied pressure to intelligence agencies 
to support the coalition case against Iraq, it did conclude that Australian 
'Intelligence was thin, ambiguous and incomplete.'32 This report 
followed a furore a year earlier when former senior intelligence analyst 
Andrew Wilkie resigned in protest over the Australian Government's 
actions in relation to the Iraq war, claiming that 'Australia's spies knew 
the United States was lying about Iraq's WMD programme.'33 Australian 
involvement in Iraq derives neither from specific interest in the Middle 
East, nor a wider interest in being a good international citizen. Rather, it 
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reflects the lengths to which Australia is prepared to go to persuade the 
Bush Administration that Australia is a reliable ally. Echoing Burchill, 
Maley concludes that the risks of such open-ended commitments, both 
for Australia and for Australians, are considerable. 
Despite growing unease in several quarters over Australia's support of 
the US in Iraq, Prime Minister John Howard conftrmed in April 2005 
that Australia would deploy more troops to Iraq, doubling its military 
presence there. This came despite wide criticism domestically of 
Australia's further entrenchment in Iraq after an explicit 2004 election 
campaign pledge that this was not envisaged. Howard's public 
acknowledgment that the decision would be an unpopular one34 did 
nothing to assuage the deepening sense that Australia's foreign policy 
alignment is increasingly a shadow of US policy. When the Lowy 
Institute asked Australians in February 2005 whether Australia takes too 
much or too little notice of US foreign policy, 68 per cent said 'too 
much'. Heading off such criticism, the Prime Minister explained in an 
address to the Lowy Institute the following month that Australian troops 
would be offering security protection to Japanese personnel in AI-
Muthanna province in response to a formal request from its regional 
partner, Japan, and providing further training of Iraqi security forces. 35 
This decision to 'lend a hand for freedom' 36 made no mention of the 
Australia-US alliance, though the rhetoric was rather familiar. What is 
transparent, however, is that Australia's deepening support of the US in 
Iraq helps to fill a military, and increasingly an ideological, void left by 
the withdrawal of 14 member states from the original 'coalition of the 
willing', including Spain and the Philippines in 2004, followed by the 
Netherlands in 2005, and Italy'S intended departure by June 2006. In 
February 2006, while British Parliament debated its possible 
commencement of a military withdrawal by the end of the year, it was 
reported that Japan would leave Iraq 'within months'. But in Australia it 
was reported that, after discussions in Washington between Australia, 
Britain, the US and Japan, Australia was considering keeping its troops in 
Iraq after imminent the Japanese withdrawal. 
As the Federal Government pondered its continued military presence 
in Iraq, the country's most damning corruption scandal ever continued 
to unfold. In order to secure contracts during the post-Gulf War UN-
sanctions against Iraq, the Australian Wheat Board (AWE), which has a 
monopoly over Australian wheat exports, allegedly siphoned off AUD 
$300 million to Saddam Hussein through inflated wheat prices and 
bogus transport costs. Prickly military involvement and shady 
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transactions notwithstanding, in 2005 Australia stimulated a burst of 
trade activity with the Middle East. At the time of the 1991 Gulf War, 
Australian exports to the Middle East amounted to just over A UD $2 
billion but this figure had climbed to around AUD $5.2 billion by 
2004. 37 The Australian Government is in the midst of concerted efforts 
to establish a more coherent working relationship with nation-states in 
the Middle East and a Joint Standing Committee reported in February 
2005 on strategies for the expansion of Australia's trade and investment 
relations with the Gulf States. This was followed in March by the 
Australian Trade Minister's announcement of the initiation of 
negotiations on a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (PTA) with the UAE, 
Australia's first for the Middle East region. It would also be the fIrst 
FTA entered into by the UAE.38 The 'Expanding Australia's trade and 
investment relations with the Gulf States' report makes key 
recommendations for increasing Australia's trade representation in the 
Gulf and developing areas of technical co-operation, such as in mining 
and agriculture, but also to develop strategies for the export of defence-
related hardware and services. The latter seeks to expand the trade 
parameters of the Australia-UAE relationship, which substantially turns 
on crude petroleum imports 39 and motor vehicle exports. 40 The volume 
of these two main areas of import-export in the UAE dwarf trade on 
other resources and products, ranging from liquefIed propane to 
jewellery and glassware, and Australian zinc and meat.41 
In terms of Australia's current trade relationships with the Gulf States, 
the most lucrative activity takes place with Saudi Arabia. Motor vehicle 
exports to Saudi Arabia are four times higher than to the UAE,42 while 
petroleum imports, both crude and refmed, are on a par with the UAE,43 
accounting for the greater part of Australian imports from Saudi Arabia. 
Motor vehicle exports to the Middle East are strong - one in five cars 
sold in the Middle East is Australian-made44 - but otherwise trade data 
with the Gulf States generally is uninspiring. Australian imports and 
exports between Jordan, Iran and Iraq, for example, are negligible. Trade 
activity between Australia and the North African Arab States slides even 
further into insignifIcance. Only Mauritania and Morocco show some 
signs of life in terms of projected growth while Tunisia and Algeria seem 
destined for stagnation by current estimations. 45 MacQueen sets out to 
explore the 'missing link' of Australian trade activity with North Africa in 
Chapter 10. 
As MacQueen points out, while trade and investment continue to take 
precedence in the nurturing of the Australia-Middle East relationship, 
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political, social and cultural exchanges remain insubstantiaL The 
relationship between Australia and the North African Arab States (those 
of the Arab Maghrib Union or AMU) have been negligible. Outside the 
areas of trade in primary products (principally oil and gas from the 
region and agricultural products to the region) each of the respective 
partners has a minimal impact on and presence in each other's region. 
However, as Australia seeks to boost its presence in the Arab world in 
the realms of trade and political and cultural relations, the Maghrib 
provides a fertile ground in which both parties could benefit greatly. 
MacQueen focuses on the history of the relationship between Australia 
and the states of the AMU and seeks to single out areas in which this 
association can be fostered in order to promote a relationship that can 
take a valuable and prominent place in the broader relationship between 
Australia and the Arab world. 
The volume concludes with a discussion of Australia's strategic 
interests in the Middle East and the human rights challenge. Mansouri 
and Sankari discuss current trends and future prospects in the economic 
and trade relationships between Australia and the Middle East and 
propose a new approach that links in a principled manner economic 
interests to local discourses on democratization and human rights. The 
chapter places the economic relationship in its wider social and political 
contexts arguing that a narrow focus on short term trade opportunities 
will not serve Australia's long term strategic interests in the region. 
Chapter 11 concludes by suggesting that, should Australia widen the 
strategic sphere of its engagement with the region by incorporating a 
consistent and systematic approach to human rights and other 
humanitarian issues, it would do greater justice to its stated commitment 
to global human rights and democracy. As the situation currently stands, 
Australian foreign policy has neither been equivocal nor consistent on 
the issue of linking trade to human rights, but the time is ripe for such a 
move to take place. 
Events continue to move with such speed that it has been impossible 
to incorporate all the current shifts, not only in Australian immigration 
and foreign policy, but in the broader world context. Coordinated bomb 
attacks in London on 7 and 21 July 2005 took terrorism debates into a 
new direction when it was found that young Pakistanis born in Britain 
were responsible, adding further to the intricate nature of identity politics 
and social discontent. In Australia, the much publicised terror plots 
aborted in late 2005 in Melbourne coupled with Sydney's 'race riots' 
reinforced the notion of Arab and Muslim migrants as potentially 'hostile 
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strangers' unable or unwilling to integrate into the nation state. The 
Sydney riots in particular, where attack and counter-attack between 
Middle Eastern and Anglo-Australians climaxed when 'an angry crowd 
of 5,000 Anglo-Australians staged vicious mob attacks on dark-skinned 
beachgoers and on people they believed to be Muslims', revealed a deep 
antagonism and hostility toward Arab and Muslim migrants. 46 The 
situation was exploited by a 'neo-Nazi group known as the Patriotic 
Youth League, which has links to the German-based skinhead group 
Volksfront and the British National party, also used the rally to promote 
white supremacism'.47 While the Federal Government insisted that 
racism is not an underlying factor in the Sydney riots, opinion polls 
showed that 75 per cent of those surveyed think that there is underlying 
racism in Australia48 • 
It is ironic that the very neo-liberal policies pursued by Western 
countries such as Britain and Australia and their globalization agenda are 
presenting new challenges to the concept of citizenship as conceived in 
the modern nation-state. Indeed, British youth of Muslim background, 
like Australian youth of Muslim background, may challenge the 
exclusionary juridical and social nature of citizenship and often articulate 
dual forms of attachment that reflect their hyphenated identities. Yet, the 
hybridity of Arab and Muslim youth in increasingly multicultural 
Western societies such as Australia should also be seen as a proof that 
rapprochement between the Middle East and the West is not only 
possible but ultimately unavoidable. It is for this reason that a deeper 
understanding of the Australia-Middle East connection is a timely 
endeavour. The Middle East, a complex region that has remained 
peripheral in much of Australia's history, is destined to always come to 
prominence in times of wars, conflicts or terrorist activities. The 
chapters in this book make a collective attempt to unlock the complexity 
of the Australia-Middle East connection not only at the level of military 
engagements but also the level of cultural encounters and economic 
interests. 
